



# Navy Antiterrorism/Force Protection (AT/FP) Program


CAPT Dan J. Morgiewicz,  
USN

11 February 2004



# *Prologue*

- *Navy AT/FP Evolved in response to:*
  - Beirut Barracks '83 (Long Commission)
    - ATAC
    - NIS Code 24 / OP 09N
  - Khobar Tower '96 (Downing Task Force)
    - OPNAV N34
    - IVA Program Stood Up
    - Training Continuum begun for all hands
  - USS Cole '00 (Gehman/Crouch Commission)
    - AT/FP Task Force
    - PIVA begun for expeditionary ports
    - NWP / NTTP / NMETLS
  - 9/11
    - AT/FP Task Force, Round 2
    - Formal Melding of N34/Code 24





# *History of Terrorist Attacks*

|                       | Beirut                             | Khobar Towers              | African Embassy             | Cole                   | 11 Sep                 |
|-----------------------|------------------------------------|----------------------------|-----------------------------|------------------------|------------------------|
| Perceived Threat      | Sniper                             | Small bomb (interior)      | Small bomb (interior)       | Pier Side Attack       | None                   |
| Destructive Mechanism | Bomb                               | Bomb                       | Bomb                        | Bomb                   | Hijacked Airplane      |
| Delivery Method       | Truck                              | Truck                      | Truck                       | Boat                   | Hijacked Airplane      |
| Geographic Region     | ME                                 | ME                         | Africa                      | ME                     | US                     |
| Intel                 | General threat                     | General threat             | General threat              | General threat         | None                   |
| Lesson                | Application of rules of engagement | Greater stand-off distance | Recognize world-wide threat | Anticipate new methods | US at Risk, innovation |



# *New Assumptions/Mindset*

- We Face:
  - Strategic “Anti-Access” Terror Campaign
  - Well Resourced/Trained/Motivated Opponents
  - Multi-Theater Operations
  - Large Vehicle Bombs Remain a Likely Threat
  - Targets May Include Ships, Aircraft, Bases
  - Not Necessarily (Not Primarily) Military
  - World-Wide Threat, Including (Especially) Urban Areas
  - Suicide Bombers
  - Possible Rogue Actors
- So ....
  - “Really” Need Competent Deterrent Posture, Scalable According to Threat/I&W





# *Be Prepared to ....*

- **Deter**

- “Hard Look”
  - Weapons
  - Uniforms
  - Body Armor
  - Dogs
- Randomness
  - Roving/Mobile Forces
  - Measures

- **Detect**

- Open Eyes and Ears
- Technology
- Intel/Law Enforcement Liaison
- Counter-Surveillance

- **Defend**

- Reaction

- **Mitigate Consequences**

- Pre-Planned Responses





# ***N34/NCIS***

- N3/N5 responsible for AT/FP - Operational mindset/structure to report to CNO
- NCIS(NO9N) responsible for LE/Phys Security
- Merger left basic functions of N34 & NCIS intact
  - Advocated by Navy leadership (VCNO) since 1997
  - Parallel with Joint Staff and other Services
  - Builds on combined expertise of the two organizations
  - Single “belly button”/SMEs
- Synergy of effort
  - AT/FP, law enforcement, physical security, CbT and Counterintelligence functions are intrinsically linked
  - Cannot divide current N34/NCIS organization without incurring duplication of effort



# ***N34/NCIS***

- Enhances speed and agility, force multiplier
- Assessment sponsor is honest broker
  - Independent and unencumbered by constituencies
- Co-locates all aspects of AT/FP with N34 in charge:
  - Policy, Doctrine, Training
  - Vulnerability Assessments, CBRNE
  - RDT&E, Leverage Technology, Security Systems
  - PPBS and Budget Execution
  - Law Enforcement/NSF, Reserves/Personnel
  - Personal Security Operations, Regional Inv. Coord.
  - Nuclear Weapons Security, USMC MSF Bn (FAST)




# ***N34/NCIS***

- Seamless ID of threats (terrorist, CBRNE, criminal and foreign intel) and response
- N34/NCIS focus is AT/FP only
- Interacts with Congress, GAO, Naval Audit Service, others w/one voice
- Closer Navy working relationships with Interagency and DOD technology working groups
  - Minimizes duplication of effort
  - Quicker solutions



# ***Threat Levels***

- Threat Level Measures Degree of Risk to personnel, facilities, assets or interests
- DIA Declares Threat Level based on threat factors





# ***Force Protection Conditions***

- Force Protection Condition (FPCON):
    - Decision by Responsible Commander to guard against the threat
  - Selected based on assessment of the threat
  - Subordinates May set Higher Condition/Measures
- 
- A green arrow pointing upwards, labeled "Escalation" in white text, is positioned to the left of the FPCON list.
- FPCON Delta
  - FPCON Charlie
  - FPCON Bravo
  - FPCON Alpha
  - FPCON Normal- General Global Threat of Terrorist Activity
    - Baseline security posture (no specific measures identified)



# ***Security Continuum***

- **Good Order and Discipline**
- **Law Enforcement**
  - Anti-Theft/Vandalism, Traffic/Crowd Control, Missing Persons, Drugs, etc
- **Security**
  - Anti-Espionage, Physical Security, Surveillance, High Value Compounds
- **High-Risk Billets/Personal Security Details**
- **Force Protection**
  - Anti-Terrorist
  - Scalable Deterrent Posture (Threat Driven)
- **Nuclear Weapons Security**
  - Constant, "Zero Defect" Posture - Consequence Driven (Not Threat)
- **War-Fighting**
  - Lock Down, Defeat "SPETZNAZ-Level" Threat, "Fight for Life"



# *Training Continuum*

- Level I
  - All hands basic situational awareness and program standards
- Level II
  - ATO for ship or commands
- Level III
  - PXO/PCO training
- **Level IV**
  - Senior command, flag level training done by JCS
- Fleet level training
  - Conducted by fleet commands at the individual, unit and battle group levels







# *Initiatives (Training)*

- CATNSF: Center for Antiterrorism/Naval Security Forces
  - Single center of Navy ATFP training
  - Armed Sentry
  - “Chief of the Guard”
  - Commanders Course – Level III add on options
- NSF 21 training review
  - NCIS/N34 level review of MA training program
- Web Based Level I Training
  - Broadening distribution
  - Enhanced Server to accommodate high usage level
  - Updated guidance regarding hijacking



# Naval Security Forces

End-  
strength  
 01=4882  
 02= 7364  
 03=  
 10367\*  
 04 =  
 10367\*  
 05 =  
 10367\*  
 06 =  
 10367\*  
 07 =



|     |            |      |      |      |      |
|-----|------------|------|------|------|------|
| 459 | 1115       | 692  | 450  | 250  | 250  |
| 250 | Conversion | 1994 | 2250 | 2250 | 1179 |
| 535 | 2064       |      |      |      |      |




# *Ongoing Initiatives*

- MA Evolving to NSF
- NCIS Transformation
- Policy and Doctrine
  - NWP, NTTP
- Comprehensive Retooling of Training
  - Simulators, Distance Learning
- Nuclear Weapons Security
- Military Sealift Command Force Protection
- HN/Local Cooperation/Support
  - 2 Way Street
- Mobile Security Force
- Technology .....




# *Acquisition Roles and Responsibilities*





# *Acquisition Coordination*





# *Vulnerability Assessment*

- Conducted by either the Joint Staff (JSIVA) or CNO (CNOIVA)

- Mandatory every 3 years; every 1 year for bases in high threat areas

- Are done for military installations only



Security



- Port Integrated Vulnerability Assessments (PIVA) conducted by teams made of fleet representatives and NCIS security specialists
- Timing dependent on Fleet Commanders needs and risk assessment
- For expeditionary ports both CONUS and OCONUS



# ***NAS North Island Overall Plan***





# *Perimeter Security*



Sensored Wall



Sensored Fence



Pedestrian Access



Vehicle



Cameras



# ***Proposed Smart Gates***



**Pier Gate**


**Main Gate**

**Golf Course Gate**



# Main Gate

REFERENCE PLAN  
VIEW FOR EQUIPMENT  
DESCRIPTIONS




VEHICLE CONTROL DIAGRAM  
AUTHORIZED ENTRY & EXIT  
VISITOR ENTRY & EXIT  
(5 LANES TYPICAL)  
PRELIMINARY DESIGN





# *Pier Gate*

REFERENCE PLAN  
VIEW FOR EQUIPMENT  
DESCRIPTIONS




VEHICLE CONTROL DIAGRAM  
AUTHORIZED ENTRY & EXIT  
ONLY (4 LANES TYPICAL)  
PRELIMINARY DESIGN





# ***Waterside Security System***



Line of  
Demarcation




Boat Barrier



Anti-swimmer




Pier Access  
and Fence



Radar /




# Waterside Security System





# *Flightline Security*




**Pedestrian  
Access**



**Vehicle**



**Sensored Fence**




**Buried Line  
Sensor**



**Cameras with  
Video Motion  
Detection**



# Ashore C2 - Regional Structure





# ***Technology vs. Manpower***

- Technology cannot fully replace manpower
- Technology can assist to deter, detect, delay and assess, making manpower more efficient
  - CCTV and swimmer sonar “display a picture,” but someone must interpret it
  - Card swipe systems still require personnel to make badges, manage data base and monitor systems
  - Technology use at Entry Control Point (ECP) adds risk (e.g., piggybacking) and some delay
- Response and neutralization (roving patrols and reaction force) always require personnel



# Questions



**BLANK**



# ***Counter Bomb/Counter Bomber ACTD***



- In beginning phase
- Demos begin in FY 04
- Assessment phase:
  - Relational analysis
- Detection phase:
  - Identify bomber threat
  - Characterizes potential threat
  - Standoff detection is goal
- Mitigation phase:
  - Long range neutralization
  - Blast and fragment



# ***Cons Against N4 - N34***

- No single focus on AT/FP
- Less speed and agility
- Loss of operational mindset
- Loss of synergy, “scattering the coals”
- Creates new seams
- No N4 link to intelligence, threat or law enforcement pieces of the FP continuum
- Less objectivity due to N4 being resource sponsor with constituencies
- CFFC does not possess necessary staff, experience or authority to take on N34 responsibilities



# ***ASSESSMENTS***


- Joint Staff Integrated Vulnerability Assessments
  - JS/DTRA Experts
  - Assess DOD Installations World-wide
- CNO Integrated Vulnerability Assessments
  - Completed by NCIS/CNO N34 Experts
  - Assess US Naval Installations World-wide
- Port Integrated Vulnerability Assessments
  - Completed by CINC staff and local NCIS agent
  - Assess non-US navy ports both in US and abroad



# *Security Programs*


## **Swimmer Detection**

- AN/WQX-2 swimmer detection sonar undergoing upgrade
- Also developing and testing COTS (e.g. Kongsberg) sonar head and others with help from NAVSEA



## **Waterside Security Systems**

- Combined radar and electro-optics (both thermal and CCTV) to detect and classify targets
- Currently installing in La Maddalena, Gaeta, Sounda Bay, Augusta Bay, Rota and San Diego Region






## Navy Explosive Detection Equipment

- EGIS II desktop, VaporTracer 2 handheld and Rapiscan 520 X-ray imaging system were judged best by the Navy/N34
- Mobile vehicle being evaluated for large vehicles.

## Force Protection and Physical Security Communities of Practice Program

- Web enabled portal designed to collect, organize and disseminate information to the AT/FP and Physical security community
- Variety of tools available





## Steel Port Security Barriers

- Will stop up to 38 foot go-fast boat weighing 8000 lbs at 52 mph
- 50 foot units; 8 ft tall; 8500 lbs
- \$520 per linear foot; steel construct



## Composite Port Security Barriers

- Design and testing
- Will stop up to 38 foot go-fast boat weighing 8000 lbs at 52 mph
- 50 foot units; 8 ft tall; 4200 lbs
- \$720 per linear foot; fiberglass polymer
- Design and testing





## Dunlop Security

### Barriers

- Will stop up to 38 foot go-fast boat weighing 8000 lbs at 52 mph
- 82 foot units; 8 ft tall; 3000 lbs
- \$580 per linear foot; rubber coated textile with steel cable

### Lines of

### Demarcation

- 20 year life; little maintenance
- No boat stopping capability
- Physical line in water to show restricted area boundaries
- Can be of various sizes and constructs; depending on desired usage
- Design and testing





## • Vehicle control

Large Vehicle Mobile X-ray Trucks for inspection at gates

- Presently in use at NSA Bahrain and NS San Diego
- Future sites: TBD



Access Control at gates includes barriers and new pass technology





# ***Technology/Security Equipment***

- **Flightline Security – Electronic Sensors, Ongoing**
  - NAS Rota
  - NAS LeMoore
- **Special Weapons Access Upgrades**
  - SWFPAC Bangor
  - SWFLANT Kings Bay
  - TACAMO Travis AFB, Tinker AFB, NAS Patuxent River
- **General IDS for Bases, Upgrades/New**
  - NSA Bahrain
  - Camp David





# ***NASNI Test Event***

## **Goals -**

Deliver ATFP Technology Systems with

- Speed *and* Support
- Reduced Reliance on Manpower
- Interoperability and Tailor-ability



## **Approach**

- A Common ATFP C2 System with Standard Interface for Sensors/Engagement Systems
- A “Catalog” of Available Sensors/Engagement Systems to feed the ATFP C2 System
- Transition for each of these into a SYSCOM Program of Record for ILS



# ***Swimmer Detection Sonar (SDS)***


- **NAVSEA Testing at North Island**
  - 4-6 COTS types expected
  - Test & Evaluation in progress
  - Long poles:
    - Environmental assessment
    - Contracting / solicitation
    - Platform availability
    - Diving services





# ***Waterside Security System—North Island***

Operational  
in April 2003



**Boat Line of  
Demarc. /  
Barrier**



**Swimmer**



**Radar / EO**



# Area Security Operations Command and Control (ASOCC) Deployment

Information  
Management

Situation Management

Collaboration

The screenshot displays the ASOCC system interface, which is a multi-echelon decision and collaboration C2 system. It consists of several interconnected windows:

- KnowledgeBoard v2.9 (ASOCC View):** This window shows a Terrorism Advisory Channel, Intel Situation Reports, and Department of State SITREPs. It includes a WebChat ZERO TOLERANCE F and a list of current OPS Message Traffic.
- IS ViewPoint - Extensible Information Systems ViewPoint:** This window displays a map of the United States with various locations marked, including Andrews AFB, USNS APACH, LAWLEY AFB, and POPE AFB. It also shows a table of events with columns for Time, Location, and Event Title.
- Reaction to Threat: Microsoft Internet Explorer provided by DISA:** This window shows a list of threats and a table of events. It includes a section for "Reaction to Changed Threat Condition" with a list of actions to be taken.
- Log Entry Form:** This window is used for logging events. It includes fields for Operator, Base/Installation, Location, Current Threat Condition, and Event Information.

The interface is designed to provide a comprehensive view of the operational environment, allowing for real-time decision-making and collaboration among various stakeholders.

**ASOCC is fully integrated multi-echelon decision and collaboration C2 System.**

1. The ASOCC Mission needs statement developed as a direct result of USS Cole bombing.
2. All requirements have been validated and mapped through the Joint process.
3. Licensed to operate for 3 years on SIPR net by DISA. Interim authority to operate on NIPR net for 1 year by DISA.



# ***JHOC using ASOCC Common Operating Picture***

## **Shared Features**

## **Non-Federal Features**

**(state, non-profit,  
private**

**sector, and public)**

- USN Escort PBs
- USCG Escort Vessel
- Customs Inspections
- Border Patrol Interest
- Security Zone Management
- Story Boards
- Incident Briefing
- Weather and Tides
- Incident Action Plans
- Response Objectives
- Resources-At-Risk Summary
- Situation Display Map
- Incident Area Map/Chart
- Digital Photos
- Organization Chart
- Incident Status Summary
- Resource Status
- Meeting Schedule
- Blue Force Locator

- Vessel and asset real-time position tracking on Radar
- 96 Hr Notice of Arrival
- Port Security alerts
- Broadcast Notice to Mariners
- Chat Room
- Port Security Video Surveillance Monitoring
- Vessel Schedule Calendars
- General Port Info and Dir
- Vessel Characteristics
- Marine Terminal Database
- Marine Event Permits
- Hazardous Cargo Tracking
- Ad Hoc Web Reporting & Analysis
- Secure shared database
- Incident log tracking
- Wireless PDA Integration

- Chat Room
- Automatic Alerts
- Smart Scheduling / auto schedule de-confliction
- Pilot and Tug Dispatching
- Biometrics for Access
- Control Room Facility





# ASOCC Deployments



## NCR - CADII

- **DTRA**
- **DISA**
- **NGB**
- **NOC**
- **MTAC**
- **ATF**
- **JITF-CT**
- **PFPA**
- **NDW**
- **MDW**
- **11<sup>th</sup> Wing [Bolling]**
- **DHS Nebraska Ave**
- **ACTD HQ**
- **Coast Guard HQ**
- **FEMA HQ**
- **FEMA Reg. 3**
- **FEMA NCR ERT**
- **Secret Service**
- **Customs**
- **Border Patrol**
- **HHS OEP**
- **FBI SIOC**
- **NCR JTTF**
- **U.S. Marshals service**
- **ATF**
- **MWCOG HQ**
- **DCEMA**
- **VADEM**
- **MEMA**
- **Arlington County**
- **ECC**
- **Prince Georges Cty**

## Hampton Roads

- **NAVNORTH**
- **JFCOM**
- **MARFORNORTH**
- **NORTHAF**
- **JFHQ HLS**
- **JTF-CS**
- **Norfolk EOC**
- **Chesapeake EOC**

**Bold** = Installed  
 Regular = Near term installations planned  
*Italics* = NORTHCOM Sponsorship



# **FY03 Physical Security Equipment (PSE) OPN**

- **FY03 OPN = \$107.1M**
- **MSC: \$40.2M**
- **Boat barriers: \$20.5M**
- **Waterside Security Systems: \$21.2M**
- **MILCON Intrusion Detection Systems: \$15.0M**
- **Other: \$6.35M**
- **JHOC: \$2.5M**
- **NDW: \$1.0M**
- **LRAD: \$0.35M**
- **Contingency: --**
  - **Due to recent transfer to SSP and AAUSN inflation adjustment**



# **Waterside Security Systems (WSS)**


- **WSS installations in progress or in planning:**
  - **In progress: North Island**
    - Issue: contractor performance
  - **In planning:**
    - Souda Bay
    - La Maddalena, Gaeta, Augusta Bay
    - Norfolk
- **Long-term plan (FY04 to FY07): WSS and boat barrier installations in 13 other significant CONUS and OCONUS Navy ports**
- **Key to long-term plan: NAVFAC execution of OPN funding**



# ***US Port Security***

- **Waterside Security Systems**

- Provides 24/7 surface RADAR, electro-optical and sub-surface SONAR coverage with integrated command and control.
- Installed at NAS North Island and NSA Bahrain, NSBs Kings Bay/Bangor
- Future Installations: NS San Diego, NSB Point Loma, Norfolk, La Maddalena, Gaeta, Augusta Bay, and Souda Bay





# ***Technology/Security Initiatives***

- **Camp David**
  - Perimeter IDS
  - Perimeter CCTV
  - New Monitoring Equipment
- **Brunswick – “Gate Keeper/Smart Gate”**
  - CAC with new “contactless” technology
  - Wearable Wireless Computers for Gate Guards
  - Fully automated access control and visitor processing
- **Guantanamo Bay, Cuba**
  - Emergency Command Center
  - Perimeter Optics to thermal and long range
  - Camp Delta perimeter security system
  - Flightline / Waterside security system

